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ABSTRACT
Biotechnology is a rapidly growing field that has pushed the limits of patent eligible subject matter.
In response to the expansion of biotechnology, critics have emerged with both economic and moral
concerns over the development and patenting of these technologies. On the economic front, critics are
wary of the potential development of an “anticommons.” On the moral front, critics are concerned
with the potential to erode human dignity and “play God.” Congress has responded to the moral
concerns with section 33 of the America Invents Act. Section 33 states that “[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of law, no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human
organism.” This provision was intended to ban the patenting of human beings at any stage of
development, including embryos, fetuses, human/non-human chimeras, and clones. However, the
vague wording of section 33 and the absence of definitions for “directed to” and “human organism,”
give courts wide latitude when construing section 33, possibly leading to a construction that
invalidates several biotechnology inventions.
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DIRECTED TO OR ENCOMPASSING A HUMAN ORGANISM: HOW SECTION 33
OF THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT MAY THREATEN THE FUTURE OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY
AVA CAFFARINI*
INTRODUCTION
“There is no medicine like hope, no incentive so great, and no tonic so powerful as
expectation of something better tomorrow.”1
To some, biotechnology is a hope for a better tomorrow. 2 To others, biotechnology
is an ethical battleground.3 To all, biotechnology is a cutting edge industry that
utilizes living organisms to create products with the potential to revolutionize
modern life.4 The cutting edge nature of biotechnology carries with it the
understanding that many useful inventions will be mired in controversy. 5 This
controversy is both morally and economically focused; some critics object to the
patenting of living organisms generally or to experimentation with specific types of
organisms,6 while others object to biotechnology patents because they drive up the
cost of innovation, and threaten to slow scientific research. 7 Despite public objection,
however, biotechnology patents continue to be issued at a constant rate. 8
* © Ava Caffarini 2013. Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2013. The John Marshall Law School.
Bachelor of Science in Molecular and Cellular Biology, May 2010, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign. To my mother and father, Angelinn and Joseph Caffarini, for all of their love and
support during the turbulent times of law school. To my brother, Joseph, whose love for molecular
biology rivals my own. To my editors, Levon Barsoumian and Michael Carrozza, for helping me
through this daunting process, and finally, to all of my friends who made law school a significantly
more enjoyable experience.
1 Orison Swett Marden.
2 See Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Approves a Stem Cell Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at B1
(discussing the first FDA-approved trial on human stem cells).
3 See Jocelyn E. Mackie et al., Lessons on Ethical Decision Making from the Bioscience
Industry, 3 PLOS MED. 605, 605–10 (2006) (discussing ethical issues in bioscience); Margo A. Bagley,
Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 469, 469–72 (2003) (remarking on controversial biotechnology inventions).
4 See Ashish Swarup Verma et al., Biotechnology in the Realm of History, 3 J. PHARMACY &
BIOALLIED SCI. 321, 321 (2011).
5 See, e.g., J. Suaudeau, From Embryonic Stem Cells to iPS—An Ethical Perspective, 44 CELL
PROLIFERATION 70, 70–80 (2010) (discussing controversy surrounding stem cell research); Mildred
Cho, Patently Unpatentable: Implications of the Myriad Court Decision on Genetic Diagnostics, 28
TRENDS IN BIOTECH. 548, 548–51 (2010) (discussing controversy surrounding gene patents); Bagley,
supra note 3, at 469–70 (discussing controversy over transgenic animals, and methods of cloning
humans).
6 See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 3, at 469–70 (discussing the controversy over transgenic animals
and methods of human cloning).
7 See, e.g., Peter Lee, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE
L.J. 659, 662–64 (2004) (discussing the economic problems related to patents and cost).
8 Dov Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the Bayh-Dole
System for Both Developed and Developing Nations, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
311, 313–20 (2009).
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Congress responded to some of these concerns with section 33 of the LeahySmith America Invents Act (“AIA ”),9 which states that “[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law, no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a
human organism.”10 Although not yet addressed by the courts, section 33 can
potentially be construed quite broadly, thereby derailing patent eligibility for a wide
range of inventions.11
Part I of this comment provides both legal and historical bases for the
controversy surrounding biotechnology patents. Part II analyzes some ways that
section 33 may be construed and the implications of those constructions on the future
of biotechnology patents. Part III offers a way for legislators to amend section 33 that
can avoid invalidating biotechnology patents.
I. BACKGROUND
This section first discusses the patentability of subject matter involved in
biotechnology inventions and highlights the arguments some commentators have
made, both for and against the patenting of such inventions. The section then
proceeds by explaining the history of section 33, and concludes with a brief
presentation of the mechanics used in statutory construction.
A. Patent Eligibility of Biotechnological Subject Matter
To be eligible for patent protection, inventions must fall within one of the
statutory categories for patent eligible subject matter listed in 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Section 101 states that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent.”12 The legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952
provided that subject matter eligibility should extend to “anything under the sun
that is made by man.”13 Accordingly, courts have consistently construed § 101 very
broadly.14 This has led to patents with extremely diverse subject matter, including
9 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
10 Id. § 33(a), 125 Stat. at 340.
11 See 149 CONG. REC. E2234–35 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2003) (statement of Rep. David Weldon)
(acknowledging, but not accepting, arguments made by the Biotechnology Industry Organization
(BIO) and the Coalition for the Advancement of Medical Research (CAMR) that § 33 would
“potentially prohibit[] patents on stem cell lines, procedures for creating human embryos, prosthetic
devices, and in short almost any drug or product that might be used in or for human beings”).
12 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
13 S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399, 1952 WL 3180.
14 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952),
reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399, 1952 WL 3180) (“Congress intended statutory subject
matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by man.’”); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer
Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001) (“[T]he language of § 101 is extremely broad. ‘In
choosing such expansive terms as “manufacture” and “composition of matter,” modified by the
comprehensive “any,” Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide
scope.’”).
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patents claiming business methods, 15 software,16 and even genetically engineered
mice.17
Of particular importance here is the patent eligibility of living organisms. This
issue was first addressed in the landmark case Diamond v. Chakrabarty.18 In that
case, the United States Supreme Court held that genetically engineered bacteria was
patent eligible under § 101 because it was the result of the inventor’s handiwork and
not a product of nature.19 The Chakrabarty decision marked the beginning of the
biotechnology revolution, and there has been a steady increase in the expansion of
patent eligible subject matter since.20
Fast forward to recent times. The Chakrabarty reasoning—that an inventor’s
handiwork is patent eligible—is being questioned by the hot debate over whether
human genes should be patent eligible subject matter under § 101. In Association for
Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & Trademark Office (hereinafter
Myriad),21 the Southern District of New York held that genes were not patent eligible
subject matter,22 but the Federal Circuit disagreed. 23 The Supreme Court initially
refused to address the matter, and instead, instructed the Federal Circuit to
reconsider the issue in light of the Court’s decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories.24 The Federal Circuit again, however, found that human
genes are patent eligible under § 101.25 The Supreme Court has now granted
certiorari limited to answering the simple question, “Are human genes patentable?” 26
B. The Controversy Surrounding Biotechnology Patents
The breadth of patent eligible subject matter under § 101 has introduced a
variety of problems into the patent system, and calls for reform have come from
15 See, e.g., Sys. & Methods to Support Info. Tech. Bus. Decisions, U.S. Patent No. 8,335,692
(filed Oct. 23, 2009).
16 See, e.g., Command User Interface for Displaying Selectable Software Functionality
Controls, U.S. Patent No. 8,255,828 (filed Sept. 30, 2004).
17 See, e.g., Transgenic Non-Human Mammals, U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984).
Despite the breadth of § 101, however, there remains some restrictions on patent eligible subject
matter. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). The laws of nature, physical phenomena
and abstract ideas, for example, are three categories of subject matter ineligible for patent
protection. Id. at 3221.
18 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
19 Id. at 310.
20 See Peter K. Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 923,
933 (2008) (crediting Chakrabarty as the starting point of the biotechnology revolution and
discussing the growth of patent eligible subject matter because of Chakrabarty).
21 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d
181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
22 Id. at 220–32.
23 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329,
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
24 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), petition for
cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012) (No. 11-725).
25 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office 689 F.3d 1303,
1325–33 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
26 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012), petition for
cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3305 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-398).
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numerous members of the legal community.27 Examples of innovations in
biotechnology that have attracted the most negative attention include genetic testing,
stem cell research, cloning, and the creation of chimeras. 28 Critics of biotechnology
patents point to two types of concerns: (1) economic concerns that focus on the
creation of a restrictive patent thicket and (2) ethical concerns over the patenting of
inventions derived from human cells and human life forms. 29 Each concern is now
addressed.
1. The Controversy Over Patent Thickets
Many believe that patent rights are necessary to spur innovation, especially in
the biotechnology industry, because the promise of patent exclusivity encourages
investors to fund expensive and risky research. 30 Critics with economic concerns,
however, point to the growing complexity of the patent landscape as foreshadowing
the development of patent thickets. 31 A patent thicket arises when several parties
hold concurrent patent rights in a variety of closely related inventions. 32 As a thicket
grows and property rights become increasingly fragmented, it becomes more and
more difficult to license all of the patents necessary to put the patented inventions to
27 See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 38–39 (2011) (listing various sources calling for patent reform);
Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing
Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1121 (2009) (“It is widely recognized that the
patent system in the United States is emerging from a period of crisis. Among other problems, the
cumulative costs of litigation generated by a plethora of weak patents that increasingly pervaded
the upstream research dimension threaten to exceed the aggregate returns from patented
innovation . . . .”).
28 See also M. Mameli, Reproductive Cloning, Genetic Engineering and the Autonomy of the
Child: the Moral Agent and the Open Future, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 87, 87–93 (2007) (discussing
objections to genetic engineering and reproductive cloning); Francoise Baylis & Jason Scott Robert,
Part-Human Chimeras: Worrying the Facts, Probing the Ethics, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 41, 41–45 (2007)
(discussing ethical concerns over the creation of chimeras); Hans-Werner Denker, Potentiality of
Embryonic Stem Cells: an Ethical Problem Even with Alternative Stem Cell Sources, 32 J. MED.
ETHICS 665, 665–71 (2006) (discussing ethical concerns surrounding stem cell research); Jon F. Merz
& Mildred K. Cho, What are Gene Patents and Why Are People Worried about Them?, 8 J.
COMMUNITY GENETICS 203, 203–08 (2005) (examining the ethical and practical concerns of
patenting genes).
29 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998) (discussing the threat of a patent
thicket); Joel Lexchin, One Step Forward, One Step Sideways? Expanding Research Capacity for
Neglected Diseases, 10 BMC INT’L HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 1, 5 (discussing the threat of patent thickets
to biotechnology).
30 See Robert Cook-Deegan & Christopher Heaney, Patents in Genomics and Human Genetics,
11 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 383, 392 (2010) (discussing the profitability of Stanford’s
patents on recombinant DNA methods); E. Richard Gold et al., Are Patents Impeding Medical Care
and Innovation?, 7 PLOS MED. 1, 2 (2009) (explaining the importance of drug patents to recoup
funds expended during research in the pharmaceutical industry).
31 See Cook-Deegan & Heaney, supra note 30, at 22–23 (discussing the rise of a potential
patent thicket in academic research); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 698–90 (discussing how
a patent thicket can emerge in biotechnology and how this issue it can be addressed from a legal
perspective).
32 James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43
J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2000).
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practical use.33 The result is the under-use of otherwise valuable technology, referred
to as an “anticommons.”34 A related concern is that individual patent holders might
block the development of new inventions by refusing to license their patented
technology. 35 This is particularly dangerous because it is nearly impossible to invent
around some biotechnology patents. 36 There is also serious concern that public access
to patented inventions related to healthcare will be limited due to cost. 37
Although the growth of patent thickets is a common concern in most fields of
biotechnology, as mentioned previously, gene patents have been the focus of more
intense academic debate than other types of patents. 38 One reason for this is because
gene patents are difficult to invent around, making them particularly susceptible to
the emergence of a patent thicket. 39 As discussed, an emerging patent thicket
involving gene patents may make it difficult and expensive to license the necessary
patent rights to create a panel of genetic tests for clinical use. 40 Additionally, there is
little incentive for the patent holder of a genetic test to improve upon the already
patented test, or to develop tests using different, but analogous technology. 41
In the case of Myriad, the claims were directed to “(1) isolated DNA containing
all or portions of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene sequence and (2) methods for
‘comparing’ or ‘analyzing’ BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene sequences to identify the
presence of mutations correlating with a predisposition to breast or ovarian cancer.” 42
While invalidating the claims based on § 101 considerations, the district court judge
also largely relied upon policy arguments, including the fear that gene patents would
33 See David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics:
The Mismeasure of
Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1684 (2007). The often-repeated
concern is that too many patents in upstream research tools will restrict downstream research and
product development because it will be too costly and time consuming to license all of the necessary
patents. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1060 (2008); Adelman & DeAngelis,
supra, at 1684 (discrediting arguments that there is a patent thicket forming in biotechnology).
34 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 698.
35 See id.
36 See Cook-Deegan & Heany, supra 30, at 23 (citing gene patents specifically as they types of
inventions that are difficult to invent around).
37 Ashton Powell et al., Spinocerebellar Ataxia: Patent and Health Professional Perspectives on
Whether and How Patents Affect Access to Clinical Genetic Testing, 12 J. GENETICS MED. S83, S84,
S90–S103 (2010).
38 See E. Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm, 12 J.
GENETICS MED. S39, S40 (2010) (noting that there have been many studies on gene patents).
39 See Merz & Cho, supra note 28, at 203.
40 Brandon L. Pierce et al., The Impact of Patents on the Development of Genome-Based Clinical
Diagnostics: An Analysis of Case Studies, 11 GENETICS MED. 202, 203 (2009).
41 See Powell et al., supra note 37, at S89–S90. The concern over emerging patent thickets,
however, may be disproportionately large when compared to studies documenting the reality of
licensing fees. See Eisenberg, supra note 33, at 1063–99 (discussing the discrepancy between the
fear of a patent thicket and the actual reality of patent licensing); Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note
33, at 1681–82 (discussing the lack of evidence to support the existence of patent thickets). A
number of studies suggest that the fear of an “anticommons” may in fact be misguided, as there is
very little empirical evidence to suggest that patent thickets exist. See Adelman & DeAngelis, supra
note 33, at 1685. For example, in the case of gene patents, commentators have recognized that
patents have been responsible for an increase in price to license gene patents, but there has been no
increased difficulty gaining access to genetic tests. See Powell et al., supra note 37, at S83.
42 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d
181, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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lead to the rise of a patent thicket. 43 In fact, he accused Myriad of participating in
anti-competitive behavior that would aid in the development of a thicket. 44 The
Supreme Court will soon weigh in on these very issues.45
2. Moral and Ethical Issues Created by Biotechnology
Biotechnology has also been the center of an ethical debate since Chakrabarty
expanded patent eligible subject matter to include life forms. 46 A few weeks after
Chakrabarty was decided, the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research issued a report
voicing potential moral and ethical issues related to genetic engineering. 47 The
Commission expressed concern about the impact of genetic engineering on humans,
including a fear that genetic engineering would change the basic nature of humanity,
give humans the ability to direct evolution, and allow humans to “play God” and
arrogantly tamper with nature.48 The Commission also expressed concerns over the
possibility of degrading human dignity by creating human/non-human hybrids.49 The
majority of objections included in the committee report were focused on moral and
social concerns grounded in religious thought. 50
Since the Chakrabarty decision and the Commission Report that followed,
objections to various biotechnology inventions have grown louder and more frequent,
Id. at 209.
Id. at 187. Despite the disproportionate amount of literature to suggest otherwise, the
concern of patent thickets in biotechnology is not restricted to gene patents. See Gold et al., supra
note 30, at 2. Other fields, including pharmaceuticals, stem cell research, biomedical engineering,
synthetic biology and medicine share concerns over the rise of patent thickets. See id.; John M.
Golden, WARF’s Stem Cell Patents and Tensions Between Public and Private Sector Approaches to
Research, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 314, 315 (2010) (discussing how WARFs licensing policies on its
stem cell patents are cumbersome and restrictive); Arti Rai & James Boyle, Synthetic Biology:
Caught Between Property Rights, the Public Domain, and the Commons, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY 389, 390–
92 (2007) (discussing how progress in synthetic biology can be slowed by flaws in both biotechnology
and software patent law). In pharmaceuticals, the main concern is the prohibitively expensive
nature of patented drugs. See Michelle Childs, Towards a Patent Pool for HIV Medicines: The
Background, 4 OPEN AIDS J. 33, 33–34 (2010). The lack of generic brands for certain drugs allows
pharmaceutical companies to increase the price of their product. See id.; Li Lui & Hongzhou Lu,
Technology Development Through Pooling ARV Drug Patents: A Vision from China, 4 OPEN AIDS J.
54, 54–55 (2010) (discussing patent pooling to lower the cost of HIV drugs); see also Gold et al.,
supra note 30, at 1–2 (discussing how patents allow the cost of drugs to remain high). Other critics
argue that patents act as a barrier to further research into potential cures for neglected illnesses.
See Lexchin, supra note 29, at 2–3.
45 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012), petition for
cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3305 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-398).
46 See Keay, Morality’s Move in Within U.S. Patent Law: From Moral Utility To Subject Matter,
40 AIPLA Q.J. 409, 421–30. See also Cook-Degan & Heaney, supra note 30, at 6; Anna Lumelsky,
Diamond v. Chakrabarty: Gauging Congress’s Response To Dynamic Statutory Interpretation By The
Supreme Court, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 641, 654–56 (2005).
47 NAT’L INFO. RES. ON ETHICS & HUMAN GENETICS, SPLICING LIFE: A REPORT ON THE SOCIAL
AND ETHICAL ISSUES OF GENETIC ENGINEERING WITH HUMAN BEINGS (1982), available at
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/documents/pcemr/splicinglife.pdf.
48 Id. at 53–77.
49 Id. at 58.
50 Id. at 53–77.
43
44
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particularly as biotechnology has expanded.51 Although different inventions in
biotechnology raise different ethical concerns, the main arguments still center on the
fear that biotechnological innovations will lead to the destruction of human dignity. 52
Objections to some inventions, such as gene patents, surgical methods, and
pharmaceuticals, rest on a different set of concerns—that patient access to the
patented invention will be limited by monopolistic behavior and cost. 53 For example,
critics who object to method patents involving medical treatments fear that these
patents will substantially interfere with medical care by subjecting doctors to
liability for patent infringement.54 Or, that such patents will shift doctors’ resources
from patient treatment to monitoring the patent landscape. 55 Still others fear that
these patents will interfere with doctors’ ability to effectively treat patients by
preventing them from utilizing knowledge disclosed in medical patents, as well as
increasing the cost of patient care as a whole.56
The patenting of living organisms, especially the patenting of animals and
components of the human body, has also received a great deal of negative attention. 57
Objections to these patents stem from the notion that life is sacred, that patents
claiming living organisms violate that sanctity and may lead to the commodification
of the human body and the erosion of human dignity. 58
Perhaps the most criticized development, however, is the patenting of inventions
derived from research on human embryos, such as stem cells, human/non-human
chimeras and clones.59 Stem cells are self-replicating cells found in both adult tissues
and developing embryos.60 Though similar in function, the two differ in that adult

51 See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Stem Cell Research as Innovation: Expanding the Ethical and
Policy Conversation, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 332, 332–41 (2010) (discussing the non-traditional
ethical considerations that arise as stem cell research expands); see also Cho, supra note 5, at 550
(discussing the ethical implications of patenting genes).
52 Shawn H.E. Harmon, Of Plants and People: Why Do We Care About Human Dignity?, 10
EMBO REP. 946, 946 (2009); see also Richard E. Ashcroft, Making Sense of Dignity, 31 J. MED.
ETHICS 679, 679 (2005) (discussing the “human dignity” argument made by bioethicists); Dónal P.
O’Mathúna, Bioethics and Biotechnology, 53 CYTOTECH. 113, 117 (2007) (discussing how
biotechnology can change the definition of personhood).
53 See Cook-Degan & Heaney, supra note 30, at 6; Tadeusz Tolloczko, Surgical Patents and
Patients—The Ethical Dilemmas, 11 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 61, 61–69 (2005) (discussing the
opposition to medical procedure patents and the harmful effect of they may have on patient access to
treatment); Childs, supra note 44, at 33–36 (discussing the potential development of a
pharmaceutical patent pool to make HIV medication more affordable to impoverished countries).
54 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29–34, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 992001 at 29–34.
55 Id. at 29–34, 2011 WL 5189089, at *29–34.
56 Id. at 29–34, 2011 WL 5189089, at *29–34.
57 See David B. Resnik, Embryonic Stem Cell Patents and Human Dignity, 15 HEALTH CARE
ANNALS 211, 211–22 (2007) (commentating that the broadness of WARF’s patents may slow stem
cell research).
58 See id. at 211–22.
59 See id. at 211–22; see also Bagley, supra note 3, at 469–70 (discussing the ethical
implications of the creation of chimeras).
60 David G. Zacharias et al., The Science and Ethics of Induced Pluripotency:
What Will
Become of Embryonic Stem Cells?, 86 MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 634, 635 (2011) (discussion of
ongoing controversy surrounding stem cell research).
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stem cells can differentiate into only the tissues that they were isolated from, 61
whereas embryonic stem cells can differentiate into any type of tissue under certain
physiological conditions.62 This characteristic of embryonic stem cells is promising to
researchers seeking cures for a variety of illnesses.63 However, research involving
embryonic stem cells has received an enormous amount of criticism because the
harvesting of these stem cells requires the destruction of a human embryo.
Opponents of embryonic stem cell research equate the destruction of an embryo to
the destruction of human life—or murder.64
C. Section 33 of the AIA
Section 33 of the AIA was Congress’s attempt to respond to the moral and
ethical concerns just mentioned. What is provided now is a brief explanation of the
origins of section 33.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has a longstanding
policy that prevents the patenting of human beings. 65 This policy was put to the test
in 1997 when a scientist, Stuart Newman, sought to obtain a patent for a
human/non-human chimera.66 A chimera is an organism that contains cells from two
or more genetically distinct sources. 67 Newman was attempting to obtain a patent to
block further research on human/non-human chimeras and force the USPTO to
clarify its policy regarding the patent eligibility of human organisms. 68 The USPTO
responded to public outcry over the patent application and issued a press release that
stated that a human/non-human chimera may be ineligible for patent protection
because of a failure to meet the moral utility requirement under § 101.69 Newman
never received a patent and his application was finally rejected in 2005. 70
In response to a similar situation involving a male-female chimera,
Representative David Weldon proposed a rider to the Commerce-Justice-State
Appropriations bill for fiscal year 2004, which stated that “[n]one of the funds
appropriated or otherwise made available under th[e] Act may be used to issue

61 Antonio Liras, Future Research and Therapeutic Applications of Human Stem Cells:
General, Regulatory and Bioethical Aspects, 8 J. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 131, 132 (2010).
62 See Daniele Lodi et al., Stem Cells in Clinical Practice: Applications and Warnings, 30 J.
EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL CANCER RES. 1, 2 (2011).
63 See Dresser, supra note 51, at 332.
64 See Giovanni Frazzetto, Embryos, Cells and God, 5 EMBO REP. 553, 553–55 (2004)
(discussing ethical considerations surrounding stem cell research and the religious basis for these
objections, emphasizing the role of the Catholic and Christian faiths in opposing stem cell research);
see also Insoo Hyun, The Bioethics of Stem Cell Research and Therapy, 120 J. CLINICAL.
INVESTIGATION. 71, 71 (2010) (comparing the destruction of preimplantation embryos with murder).
65 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2105 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012) [hereinafter MPEP].
66 See U.S. Patent Appl. 10/308,135 (filed Dec. 3, 2002).
67 Howard Wolinsky, A Mythical Beast: Increased Attention Highlights the Hidden Wonders of
Chimeras, 8 EUR. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. REP. 212, 212 (2007).
68 Stuart A. Newman, The Human-Chimera Patent Initiative, 9 MED. ETHICS 1, 4 (2002).
69 See
Media Advisory, 98-06, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Apr. 1, 1998),
http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/1998/98-06.jsp.
70 Rick Weiss, U.S. Denies Patent for a Too-human Hybrid, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2005, at A03.
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patents on claims directed to or encompassing a human organism.” 71 The purpose of
this section, which came to be known as the “Weldon Amendment,” was to codify
existing USPTO policy preventing the patenting of human organisms. 72 The Weldon
Amendment was adopted in subsequent appropriations bills,73 and as the LeahySmith America Invents Act began making headway through Congress, the Weldon
Amendment was ultimately adopted as section 33.74
The Congressional Record, both for the AIA and the Weldon Amendment as it
was proposed in 2003, indicates that section 33 was intended only to prevent the
patenting of human organisms and nothing else. 75 The Record includes a lengthy list
of biotechnology patents that should remain unaffected by section 33, including stem
cell patents, tissue culture patents, research tools, gene patents, and other inventions
derived from the human body.76 Further, section 33 only impacts patents that were
pending on, or filed after the AIA became law on September 16, 2011. 77 Congress
also discussed limitations on the way the phrase, “human organism,” is to be
interpreted. Specifically, “human organism” should exclusively include human
embryos, human/non-human chimeras, human fetuses, and human beings. 78 Almost
immediately after the AIA was passed, the USPTO recognized the potential problems
that section 33 presents, and in response, issued an office-wide memorandum stating
that it does not intend to change its patent policy because of the enactment of section
33.79
D. Statutory Construction
In practice, the limitations discussed in the legislative history of section 33 will
likely do very little to prevent the misinterpretation of the provision. Recent trends in
statutory construction emphasize the interpretation of statutory text according to the
plain meaning of the words used, independent of extrinsic sources, such as legislative
149 CONG. REC. H7248 (daily ed. July 22, 2003) (amendment offered by Rep. David Weldon).
Ryan Hagglund, Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 51, 70–71 (2009).
73 157 CONG. REC. E1177 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Christopher H. Smith) (“I
commend Chairman Lamar Smith for including in the manager’s amendment to H.R. 1249, the
America Invents Act, a provision that will codify an existing pro-life policy rider included in the CJS
Appropriations bill since FY2004.”).
74 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011).
75 See 157 CONG. REC. E1177 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Christopher H.
Smith); 157 CONG. REC. E1182 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith); 149
CONG. REC. E2417 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 2003) (statement of Rep. David Weldon); 149 CONG. REC.
E2234 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2003) (statement of Rep. David Weldon). But see infra Part II.B (examining
in detail Representative Weldon’s statements before Congress regarding to what his amendment
applied).
76 See 157 CONG. REC. E1183 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith).
77 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011).
Despite the debate created by the patents at issue in both Myriad and Prometheus, neither would be
implicated by § 33 as they were issued well before the AIA was enacted.
78 157 CONG. REC. E1178 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. David Weldon).
79 Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Senior Patent Counsel & Acting Assoc. Comm’r for
Patent Examination Policy, to Patent Examining Corps (Sept. 20, 2011), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/human-organism-memo.pdf.
71
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history.80 This method of interpretation, called textualism, attempts to give statutory
text a reasonable definition.81 Textualists reject the use of legislative history, arguing
that only the statutory text, and not the legislative history, is the law. 82 This poses a
unique problem for patent law, because courts have traditionally interpreted the
Patent Act within the context of legislative history due to its heavily contextual
nature.83 We arrive, then, at the million dollar question: How will courts construe
section 33 given that some of the important terms do not have a definition within the
context of patent law?
II. ANALYSIS
Of the terms used in section 33, two phrases are particularly problematic and
would likely be a point of contention for the courts: “directed to” and “human
organism.” The vagueness of these phrases may allow them to be construed in ways
that could disrupt the patenting of controversial biotechnology inventions. This
section begins by considering potential constructions for these phrases, then
concludes by hypothesizing about problems that may arise from such constructions.

80 See Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 1023, 1025 (1998).
81 See Daniel P. O’Gorman, Construing the National Labor Relations Act: The NLRB and
Methods of Statutory Construction, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 177, 199 (2008) (“Textualists try to identify the
meaning a reasonable person would give to the text.”); Michael Straubel, Gender Equity, College
Sports, Title IX and Group Rights: A Coach’s View, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1039, 1055–56 (1996)
(contrasting textualism with intentionalism and stating that “the modern textualist approach can be
described as a search for how an ordinary person would understand the law as written, without the
aid of extratextual sources”).
82 Straubel, supra note 81, at 1056 (illustrating textualism with reference to Justice Scalia,
who would reason that “legislative history is nothing more than the contrived statements of only a
few special interests and therefore not indicative of the prevailing intent of Congress”). Textualists
support this position by arguing that the legislative history is frequently as ambiguous as the
statute, cannot be considered the aggregation of the actual intention of each individual member of
Congress, and has not been through the constitutionally required standards of bicameralism and
presentment. See Siegel, supra note 80, at 1025.
83 See Jonathan Siegel, Naïve Textualism in Patent Law, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1019, 1020 (2011)
(noting a “radical shift in the direction of naïve textualism in the field of patent law” and that for
decades “patent law was a paradigm of richly contextualized judicial interpretation”); Peter S.
Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s
Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to its Technology Mooring,
63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1289–1314 (2011) (discussing how the Bilski Court fundamentally changed
the nature of patent law using a textualist approach to statutory interpretation in a way that would
not have otherwise occurred using different approaches); ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, AND TRADEMARKS 323 (2003) (“[T]he
[patent] statute cannot be read in isolation from the array of judicial precedent that has interpreted
nearly each of its words.”).
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A. “Directed To”
The phrase, “directed to,” is not defined anywhere in the Patent Act. 84 Therefore,
a court will begin the process of statutory construction by using the plain meaning of
the undefined phrase.85 It is instructive to consider the meaning of each term
separately, however, because no dictionary defines the terms together. 86
Some common definitions of the word, “direct,” are: (1) “to control or conduct the
affairs of; manage; govern,”87 (2) “to order or instruct with authority; command,” 88
and (3) “to cause to move, face or go in a desired direction; aim.” 89 Of these three
common definitions, the first two apply more in the business context, as in “a
manager directed his employee to fill out a timesheet.” The third definition, in
particular, “to go in a desired direction; aim,” appears most applicable given section
33’s usage: “no patent may issue on a claim directed to . . . a human organism.”90
The word “to” has multiple definitions, but most applicable in the context of
section 33 would be “in the direction of; toward.”91 Stringing these most likely
definitions together, we can ostensibly replace, “directed to,” with, “aimed toward.”
Although these definitions are a good starting point in construing the statute, it is
still unclear whether this interpretation of “directed to” is correct. A court would
then move on to consider other instances in which these words were used in the AIA,
or in the Patent Act and related regulations. 92
The word “directed” appears only one other time in the AIA, in section 5, which
states that “[a] defense under this section may be asserted only by the person who
performed or directed the performance of the commercial use.” 93 From the context of
this sentence, it is obvious that “directed” means “to control or conduct the affairs of,”
which is unhelpful in deciphering section 33. The phrase, “directed to,” appears
nowhere else in the AIA but section 33. Likewise, the term “directed” is used a

Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2012).
See Michael D. Yanovsky Sukenik, Distinct Words, Discrete Meanings: The Internet & Illicit
Interstate Commerce, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 18–19 (2011); Willison v. Race, 192 B.R.
949, 952 (W.D.Mo.1995) (using the plain meaning rule in the absence of defined terms of a statute).
86 See, e.g., Willison v. Race, 192 B.R. 949, 952–53 (W.D.Mo.1995) (construing the phrase
“motor vehicle” by defining each term individually).
87 THE NEW INTERNATIONAL WEBSTER’S COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE: DELUXE ENCYCLOPEDIC EDITION 361 (1st ed. 1996).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011).
91 WEBSTERS NEW WORLD DICTIONARY: SECOND COLLEGE EDITION 1493 (2d Ed. 1976).
92 See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2004–05 (2012) (“[I]t is a “‘normal
rule of statutory construction’ that ‘identical words used in different parts of the same act are
intended to have the same meaning.’”); Justice Robert P. Young, A Judicial Traditionalist Confronts
Justice Brennan’s School of Judicial Philosophy, Address at the William J. Brennan, Jr. Lecture on
State Constitutional Law and Gov’t (Oct. 18, 2007), in 33 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 263, 280–81 (2008)
(stating the way a textualist approaches statutory construction as “[looking] to the statute itself for
clues about meaning, to look at its structure, to examine related passages of the same
statute . . . that may be in pari materia . . . . We rely on doctrines such as noscitur a sociis.”).
93 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 5(a), 125 Stat. 284, 298 (2011).
84
85

[12:768 2013] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

780

handful of times in the Patent Act, sometimes meaning “to control or conduct the
affairs of,” sometimes meaning “aimed at.”94
While the differing definitions of the word, “directed,” as provided by common
dictionaries and looking to the Patent Act seem to further confuse the matter, the
phrase, “directed to,” is a term of art used in patent law. For years, courts have
consistently spoken of patent claims being “directed to” certain subject matter. 95 This
is consistent with the construction that defines “directed to” as “aimed toward”
certain subject matter. In addition to case law, “directed to” is used in the same
manner in the Patent Act,96 MPEP,97 and the Code of Federal Regulations. 98 The
problem lies in the fact, however, that despite being used in patent parlance, the
phrase is never actually defined, leaving open the possibility that a judge may
construe it in problematic ways. Further, patent attorneys also disagree on the
precise meaning of this often-used phrase.99 For purposes of this comment, I will
consider “directed to” to mean “aimed toward,” as provided above.
B. “Human Organism”
Determining what is considered a “human organism” goes to the heart of the
problem caused by the ambiguities in section 33. Unlike “directed to,” the phrase,
94 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(iii) (2012) (“[A]n application directed to the invention
disclosed in the application . . . .”); id. § 142 (“When an appeal is taken to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the appellant shall file in the Patent and Trademark Office a
written notice of appeal directed to the Director . . . .”); id. § 146 (“If there be adverse parties
residing in a plurality of districts not embraced within the same state, . . . the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia shall have jurisdiction [over civil actions challenging a
derivation proceeding] and may issue summons against the adverse parties directed to the marshal
of any district . . . .”).
95 See, e.g., C.W. Zumbiel Co. v. Kappos, 702 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The ‘639 patent
is directed to a carton or box . . . .”); Reese v. Verizon Cal., Inc., 498 F. App’x 980, 981 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“Reese owns U.S. Patent 6,868,150 (the ‘150 patent’), directed to methods for . . . .”);
Kingpak Tech., Inc. v. Kappos, 498 F. App’x 969, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Kingpak’s ‘008 patent
is directed to a method for manufacturing a computer module . . . .”).
96 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(iii) (“[A]n application directed to the invention disclosed in
the application . . . .”).
97 See, e.g., MPEP, supra note 65 § 1504.05 (“Unlike a utility patent application, which can
contain plural claims directed to plural inventions, a design patent application may only have a
single claim.”); id. § 821.04(b) (“Where claims directed to a product and to a process of making
and/or using the product . . . .”); id. § 2106 (“[T]he claimed invention (1) must be directed to one of
the four statutory categories, and (2) must not be wholly directed to subject matter encompassing a
judicially recognized exception . . . .”).
98 See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.141(b) (2013) (“ If the process of making and the product are not
distinct, the process of using may be joined with the claims directed to the product and the process of
making the product . . . .”); id. § 1.145 (“If, after an Office action on an application, the applicant
presents claims directed to an invention . . . .”); id. § 1.720(e)(2) (“In the case of a patent other than
one directed to subject matter within § 1.710(b)(2) claiming a method of manufacturing the
product . . . .”).
99 See Patents Directed to Human Organisms, PATENTLYO (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www
.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/patents-directed-to-human-organisms.html (“The phrase ‘directed to’
is not defined in the Patent Act or the USPTO Implementation Rules found at 37 C.F.R. § 1, et seq.
However the phrase [is] often used by patent attorneys to describe the coverage of a particular claim
and the statutory category. Even amongst patent attorneys, the usage is not uniform.”).
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“human organism,” is not a term of art in patent law, was not used anywhere else in
the AIA, and appears nowhere in the Patent Act. Further, this phrase is undefined in
most dictionaries. In this situation, the court will certainly look to the common
definitions of each term separately.
A reasonable definition for “human” is “[o]f, pertaining to, or characteristic of
humankind or people; belonging to human kind; of or belonging to the species Homo
Sapiens.”100 One definition of “organism” is “any living entity that contains one or
more cells.”101 Joining the dictionary definitions of these two words together, a
“human organism” could be understood to mean “any living entity containing one or
more cells belonging to the species Homo Sapiens.” 102
Also unlike “directed to,” the phrase “human organism,” is infrequently used in
case law. There is one Supreme Court case dealing with abortion that used that
phrase when discussing “the time at which the fetus becomes a human
organism.”103 Implicit in this usage is the understanding that a fetus is something
separate and distinct from a human organism. Unfortunately, this provides courts
with little guidance, if any, on what that “something” is.
If a court accepts a definition similar to the dictionary definition discussed
above, and finds the words used in section 33 to be clear, the statutory construction
exercise is over.104 But, if the court is looking for further guidance, it may turn to the
legislative history.105
As stated earlier, the language of section 33 was originally proposed by
Representative David Weldon in 2003 as an amendment to H.R. 2799, the
Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations bill for FY 2004. 106 Responding to criticism
from lobbyist groups opposing the amendment, Representative Weldon said it was
“absurd” that “patents on stem cell lines, procedures for creating human embryos,
prosthetic devices, and . . . any drug or product that might be used in or for human
beings” would be affected by the amendment.107 He argued before Congress that his
amendment did nothing more than provide congressional backing for the USPTO’s
policy against patenting human beings.108

SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1291–92 (6th ed. 2007).
See SCOTT FREEMAN, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE, at G21 (Beth Wilber et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011).
102 As will be shown shortly, this proposed definition using dictionaries is in direct conflict with
the legislative history of the Weldon Amendment. See SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
1291–92 (6th ed. 2007) (defining “human”).
103 See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 79 n.2 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
104 See Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1266 (2011) (“We will not take the opposite
tack of allowing ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language.”); Ratzlaf v.
United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (stating that legislative history is meant to eradicate
ambiguity, not create it); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984); Burlington N. R. Co. v. Okla.
Tax Com’n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987) (stating that when the words of the statute are unambiguous
the court is finished construing the statute).
105 See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984); William Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. Rev. 621, 656–58 (1990).
106 H.R. 2799, 108th Cong. § 801 (2003) (“None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made
available under this Act may be used to issue patents on claims directed to or encompassing a
human organism.”).
107 149 CONG. REC. E2234 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2003) (statement of Rep. David Weldon).
108 Id. at E2234–35.
100
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Representative Weldon was referring to the USPTO’s policy promulgated after
the Chakrabarty decision that “[a] claim directed to or including within its scope a
human being will not be considered patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
101.”109 This was later included in section 2105 of the MPEP, stating that “[i]f the
broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed invention as a whole encompasses
a human being, then a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101 must be made indicating that
the claimed invention is directed to nonstatutory subject matter.” 110
Although Representative Weldon called the argument “absurd” that his
amendment would prohibit “procedures for creating human embryos,” he explicitly
stated that it would “cover [all] human organisms (including human embryos).” 111
He claimed that “the only difference between [his] amendment and some of the[]
USPTO documents is that [his] amendment uses the term ‘human organism,’ while
the USPTO usually speaks of . . . ‘human being.’”112 He stated this was because
“human organism” has already been defined by Congress in a rider to an
appropriations bill, and clearly encompasses human embryos, but not stem-cells.113
In fact, Representative Weldon argued in favor of his amendment a second time in
2003, stating that it “ha[d] no bearing on stem cell research or patenting genes,” but
that it “affect[ed] patenting human organisms, human embryos, human fetuses or
human beings.”114
Due to continuing criticism, the Congressman clarified his amendment a third
time, only this time with greater specificity. On December 8, 2003, Representative
Weldon spoke before the House and said that his amendment applied to
patents on claims directed to or encompassing a human organism at any
stage of development, including a human embryo, fetus, infant, child,
adolescent, or adult, regardless of whether the organism was produced by
technological methods (including, but not limited to, in vitro fertilization,
somatic cell nuclear transfer, or parthenogenesis). Th[e] amendment
applie[d] to patents on human organisms regardless of where the organism
is located, including, but not limited to, a laboratory or a human, animal, or
artificial uterus.115
The Weldon Amendment was adopted as a “pro-life rider” in all appropriations bills
for the Department of Commerce beginning in 2004.116
The legislative history for section 33 of the AIA is much more sparse.
Representative Lamar Smith proposed what is now section 33 as an amendment to
H.R. 1249,117 which became the AIA. However, during congressional debates,
nothing new was said regarding the language of the amendment. Instead, the
Id. at E2235.
Id.; MPEP, supra note 65, § 2105.
111 149 CONG. REC. E2235 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2003) (statement of Rep. David Weldon).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 149 CONG. REC. E2417 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 2003) (statement of Rep. David Weldon).
115 149 CONG. REC. H12840 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2003) (statement of Rep. David Weldon).
116 See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
117 157 CONG. REC. E1177 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Christopher H. Smith);
see also id. at E1182.
109
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legislative history for the Weldon Amendment was merely admitted into the
Congressional Record for section 33.118
To illustrate the problems created by the phrase, “human organism,” consider
what a judge would be facing when construing this phrase. As discussed, one
possible dictionary definition for “human organism” can be “any living entity
containing one or more cells belonging to the species Homo Sapiens.” 119 The Supreme
Court has used “human organism” to mean something separate and distinct from
“human fetus.”120 The Weldon Amendment and section 33 use only the phrase,
“human organism,” yet Representative Weldon explicitly stated this included “human
organism, human embryos, human fetuses or human beings.” 121 Given these
partially overlapping and contradictory definitions, the judge would be justified in
interpreting “human organism” in countless ways. Some ways could construe “human
organism” to include the invalidation of patents on human tissue cultures, stem cell
lines and potential therapeutic treatments that may arise that utilize these
technologies.
C. The Implications of Dangerous Constructions
The hypothetical interpretation of section 33 just discussed poses a troubling
meaning, that “[n]o patent shall issue on a claim [aimed toward] or encompassing
[any living entity containing one or more cells belonging to the species Homo
Sapiens].” Given this hypothetical interpretation, the construction of section 33 is no
longer vague—it is instead troublingly broad. Although Representative Weldon
argued against such a broad construction, a judge construing the statute is free to
ignore the legislative history, and accordingly, Weldon’s arguments.122
Hypothetically speaking, a broad construction would have the destructive
potential to invalidate patents of any invention designed for consumption by humans.
The range of patents that can be invalidated is large, including personalized
medicine, pharmaceuticals, genes, prosthetics, artificial organs, research tools for
embryonic stem cell research, medical devices, and human derivatives (e.g.,
hormones, antibodies). This is because the operation of all these inventions are
“directed to,” or “aimed toward” humans, potentially falling within the language of
section 33.
Gene patents are an excellent example of patents threatened by section 33
because they are “directed to” a human organism. Patents on human genes are used
to develop tests for genetic abnormalities in humans. 123 In turn, these tests operate
See id. at E1183 (adopting the legislative history for the Weldon Amendment).
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
120 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
121 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
122 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 2 (1997) (“[G]iven the straightforward
statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history.”); Ratzlaf v. United
States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (“[W]e do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory
text that is clear.”); Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 583–84 (1994) (stating that the courts
must adhere to the statutory text over contradictory statements in the legislative history).
123 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492 (filed
Apr. 29, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (filed June 7, 1995).
118
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to determine whether a person is predisposed for certain genetic disorders. This
activity is, arguably, “directed to,” or “aimed toward” humans, and thus falls within
the language of section 33.
Proponents of biotechnology patents argue that the impact of invalidating even
one biotechnology patent based on section 33 would have enormous negative
consequences.124 Patents have been instrumental in the development of the
biotechnology industry from the Chakrabarty decision onward,125 and are so central
to biotechnology that entire companies have been established because of the economic
power that holding key patents provide.126 For nascent technology, such as
personalized medicine, the invalidation of important patents would be a death knell
because the focus of the entire industry is aimed toward developing personalized
methods for treating diseases.127 Invaliding patents in high-risk, high-cost fields,
such as pharmaceuticals, would remove incentives for companies to invest in the
development of these technologies, resulting in the slowing of innovation. 128 Further,
patents incentivize the disclosure of new inventions, and removing this incentive may
prevent the disclosure of new technology and, in the alternative, the use of that
technology as a trade secret.129 Without the promise of future patent rights, entire
areas of science may remain unexplored because the risk of failure will outweigh the
risk of investment.
III. PROPOSAL
Amending section 33 of the AIA is the most efficient way to reduce ambiguity in
the language as currently written and to avoid unnecessary litigation over its
construction. This section proposes an amendment that defines the terms used in
section 33 more precisely. Additionally, this section proposes a construction of section
33 that will have a minimum impact on the patent eligibility of existing
biotechnology inventions.
There are a few ways that section 33 could be amended to avoid the pitfalls of a
broad construction through the efforts of an activist judge. 130 First, the phrase,
“directed to,” should be removed from the language of section 33. The seemingly
124 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC
RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 20 (2006)
[hereinafter NRC RESEARCH PAPER], available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK19865/
pdf/TOC.pdf.
125 See Id. (discussing the importance of intellectual property rights to biotechnology firms);
Stankovic & Stankovic, The Selfish Patent, 3 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 195, 197 (2012)
(discussing the role that the Chakrabarty decision played in developing the biotechnology industry).
126 See Amy Landers, Liquid Patents, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 199, 207, 257 (2006).
127 Paul Gugliuzza, IP Injury and the Institutions of Patent Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 747, 758
(2013).
128 NRC RESEARCH PAPER, supra note 124, at 20–25.
129 Id. at 22.
130 See Liza Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 ALA. L.
REV. 501, 530–31 (2010) (defining judicial activism as “actions taken by judges who ‘legislate’ from
the bench by establishing laws that apply broadly to issues not presented in the individual case
before them, or by going beyond reasonable interpretations of laws to create their own versions of
the law”).
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superfluous nature of the phrase, “directed to,” used in conjunction with,
“encompassing,” is the very reason why inclusion of this phrase in section 33 is so
dangerous; any court interpreting the meaning of the statute cannot simply construe
“directed to” to be meaningless.131 “Directed to” must be given a definition, but
unfortunately, any definition that it can be given may also interfere with a variety of
biotechnology patents. Therefore, the best option is to simply remove it.
Second, the phrase, “human organism,” should be defined in a manner
consistent with the definition used in the Congressional Record. “Human organism”
is defined in the Record as “human embryos, human fetuses, human-animal
chimeras, ‘she-male’ human embryos, or human embryos created with genetic
material from more than one embryo.”132 The Record also defined “human organism”
as “human embryo, fetus, infant, child, adolescent or adult.” 133 To remain consistent
with congressional intent, stem cells and other derivatives of the human body not
considered organisms, such as tissues and genes, should be explicitly excluded from
the definition of “human organism.”134
With this proposal in mind, section 33 could be saved if Congress were to amend
it to read:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent may issue on a claim
encompassing a human organism.
For purposes of this section, human organism is defined as a human
embryo, fetus, infant, child, adolescent, adult, human-animal chimera, shemale human embryos, or human embryos created with genetic material
from more than one embryo. For purposes of this section, human organism
does not include cells, tissues, organs, or other bodily components that are
not themselves human organisms, such as stem cells, stem cell lines, genes,
and living or synthetic organs.
Nor does human organism include
hormones, proteins or other substances produced by human organisms,
methods for creating, modifying, or treating human organisms, such as
methods for creating human embryos through in vitro fertilization, somatic
131 See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, LLC 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1094, (2011); Mac’s Shell Serv., Inc. v. Shell
Oil Prods., Co., LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1251, 1254 (2010).
132 157 CONG. REC. E1184 (daily ed. June 23, 2011).
133 Id. at E1180.
134 Id.

[The Weldon Amendment] should not be construed to affect claims directed
to or encompassing subject matter other than human organisms, including but not
limited to claims directed to or encompassing the following: cells, tissues, organs,
or other bodily components that are not themselves human organisms (including,
but not limited to, stem cells, stem cell lines, genes, and living or synthetic
organs); hormones, proteins or other substances produced by human organisms;
methods for creating, modifying, or treating human organisms, including but not
limited to methods for creating human embryos through in vitro fertilization,
somatic cell nuclear transfer, or parthenogensis; drugs or devices (including
prosthetic devices) which may be used in or on human organisms.
Id.

[12:768 2013] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

786

cell nuclear transfer, or parthenogenesis, or drugs or devices which may be
used in or on human organisms.
CONCLUSION
Section 33(a) of the America Invents Act allows room for a variety of creative
constructions in the hands of a judge interested in participating in judicial
activism.135 In light of the moral controversy surrounding creation and patenting of
controversial biotechnology inventions such as human genes, stem cells and
human/non-human chimeras, section 33 may easily allow for the limiting of patent
eligible subject matter against current precedent, USPTO policy and congressional
intent. Misconstruction of this statute may lead to the invalidation of essential
biotechnology patents, the slowing of research, and the chilling of innovation in
biotechnology. It is imperative that Congress act now to prevent these issues in the
future.

135

See Vertinsky, supra note 130, at 530–31.

